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Opening Up to Our Pacific Neighbours 
Keynote Presentation delivered at the 2014 Australian Association for Pacific Studies 
Conference, University of Sydney  
22 April 2014  
 
A conference of the Australian Association for Pacific Studies seems a good place to 
say something about Australia and the Pacific Islands, and that is what I will be doing 
in this lecture. I will begin by taking us back half a century to see how Australia 
regarded the Pacific in the 1960s, and then I want to move to the 1990s and ask the 
same question. After that I would like us to consider the present situation in the 
Pacific compared with 20 years ago. And finally I would like to suggest how 
Australia‟s Pacific policy should be changed. 
As the diplomatic historian Chris Waters has shown, Australia had imperialist 
ambitions in the Pacific in the 1950s, with proposals going to the Menzies Cabinet for 
Australia to take over the Solomon Islands from the British, and for Vanuatu – then 
called the New Hebrides – to be divided, with Australia taking half of that as well. 
Australia at that stage favoured the idea of a Melanesian federation, which would 
encompass West New Guinea, Papua New Guinea and Solomon Islands.  
By the early 1960s Australia was part of an ANZUS study group on the future of the 
Pacific where the main concern, as the US Secretary of State Dean Rusk said at the 
time, was that „not one wave of the Pacific should fall under Communist influence‟. 
The thinking in Canberra at the time was that very few of the Pacific Island nations 
should be given independence. Samoa had jumped the gun by declaring 
independence in 1962, but after that the only countries suitable for independence, it 
was thought, were Fiji, Tonga and Papua New Guinea with the Solomon Islands 
added on.1 
What is striking about all this, from the perspective of 2014, is the assumption in 
Canberra that Australia would be making the key decisions about the future of the 
                                                 
1
 Christopher Waters ‘Against the Tide: Australian Government Attitudes to Decolonisation in the South 
Pacific, 1962–1972’, The Journal of Pacific History, 48:2, 2013: 194-208 
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region. By 1980, of course, almost all the former British, New Zealand and Australian 
territories in the Pacific were independent, including Papua New Guinea, and 
Australia itself had changed.  
While Australian official views about the Pacific‟s future offer one way of 
understanding Australia and the Pacific at that time, another is the status of the 
indigenous people of the Papua, which was part of Australia 1906-1975. Those 
people were Australian citizens, but as indigenous ones from that territory, they were 
not free to move around the rest of Australia or live there. The White Australia policy 
was dismantled in the early 1970s, but not, it might be argued, in relation to the 
people of Papua, and my argument is that some of that ancient thinking lives on in 
contemporary Australia. 
Jack Corbett has recently argued that observers of Pacific Islands democracy veer 
between a crisis narrative and a persistence narrative. In other words, some 
observers tend to see the region as always, or potentially, in crisis, and to define the 
Pacific Islands in terms of their perceived deficits in development, good governance, 
service delivery and so on. Others are more optimistic, and point to the persistence 
and health of democracy, advances in development, a cultural renaissance in the 
contemporary Pacific and so on.2  
Official Australia has mostly been attracted to the crisis way of looking at the Pacific. 
In 1993 the National Centre for Development Studies at the Australian National 
University produced an influential report called Pacific 2010: Challenging the Future. 
The report reflected government thinking about the Pacific at that time, and it was 
deeply pessimistic. It predicted a nightmare future for the people of the Pacific 
Islands unless their governments did what Australia was doing – reduced their public 
sectors, cut tariffs, encouraged private enterprise and allowed maximum freedom to 
foreign investors. If these measures were not adopted, the report warned, rapid 
population growth in the Pacific would mean falling living standards, decaying 
schools, urban squalor and unemployment.3 The New Zealand view tended to be 
different. Reviewing the Pacific 2010 report in 1995, Peter Pirie reached the opposite 
                                                 
2
 Jack Corbett, ‘Between crisis and persistence: Interpreting democracy narratives in the Pacific Islands’, 
Political Science, vol. 65, no. 2, 2013: 198-215 
3
 R.V. Cole, Pacific 2010: Challenging the Future, National Centre for Development Studies, ANU, Canberra, 
1993.  
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conclusion. Far from going backwards under the pressure of rising populations, the 
Pacific Island countries, he wrote, „are not about to join the fourth world. The year 
2010 should see most of them at the top end of what remains of the “developing 
world” or out of it altogether‟. He thought „the possibilities are there and the present 
trends are positive‟.4  
Taken as a whole, the Pacific Islands has experienced both crisis and advancement 
in the last twenty years, not only in the condition of its democracies, but more 
generally. There have  political, economic and development crises at various times in 
Bougainville, Solomon Islands and Nauru; political crises in Fiji; ongoing under-
performance of development in Papua New Guinea (PNG); and yet also a 
persistence of democratic forms of government everywhere outside Fiji, mostly 
accompanied by tolerable improvement in living standards. The nightmare scenario 
has not eventuated, but neither has its opposite. Instead, Pacific Island countries 
have muddled through to a variety of development outcomes, none outstanding but 
none catastrophic. PNG comes closest to fulfilling the predictions of Pacific 2010, 
with a population that has grown fast from 2.7 million at independence to an 
estimated 7.8 million last year. And the PNG government is the certainly the least 
effective of Pacific governments in delivering services. But mentioning PNG reminds 
us we that we should  question  the very idea of the Pacific Islands as a single region 
about which useful generalisations can be made. It goes without saying that life is 
very different for people in some parts of the Pacific than in others.  
 
Twenty years on from the appearance of the Pacific Islands‟ best-known crisis 
narrative, the region has defied predictions by earning a good report card on 
democracy and a middling one on economic growth and development.  
 
Pacific Democracy 
Democracy in the formal sense, defined as a constitutional system of government 
with regular elections and popularly mandated changes of government, has been the 
norm in the Pacific Islands since independence. A predictable cycle of Pacific 
elections takes place and new governments are formed democratically. Samoa and 
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Marshall Islands, for example, held elections in 2011; Kiribati, Vanuatu, Palau and 
PNG in 2012; Nauru and the Federated States of Micronesia in 2013. Solomon 
Islands, Tonga, Niue and Fiji are due to hold elections this year. Perhaps more 
importantly, constitutionalism has been maintained everywhere except Fiji. Words 
like „democracy‟ and „constitutionalism‟ may sound boringly familiar, not to say over-
used. But the fact is that the lives Pacific people lead are intimately affected by them  
 
„Democracy‟ defined more exactingly as a responsive system of government largely 
free of corruption is less common. The 2012 PNG elections revealed the dominance 
of money politics in determining electoral outcomes. All over the country the 
elections were bought, with politicians paying voters on a differential scale for first-, 
second- and third-preference votes.  Frequent changes of government characterise 
a number of Pacific polities, not only in Melanesia, where political parties are weak 
but also in Polynesia and Micronesia and in the territories as well as the independent 
states. But frequently changing governments are not necessarily unresponsive ones, 
nor do they point to state incapacity.  
 
Nevertheless, democracy has failed in one Pacific country, Fiji. Nowhere else in the 
region is a military force the central player in national politics,  and nowhere else, 
with the  exception of New Caledonia, has racial division been so central to politics. 
Uniquely in the Pacific, Fiji‟s post-independence political history has been 
punctuated by military coups and abrupt abrogations of the constitution, leading to a 
succession of political and legal orders that have undermined the faith of the people 
of Fiji in the ability of their leaders to create a lasting stability. As constitutions have 
come and gone, the very idea that a constitution is a permanent and hallowed set of 
fundamental rules has withered. And after 2009, the last time a constitution was 
abrogated, Fiji lost media freedom, key civil liberties and judicial independence, 
which were replaced by the oppressions of military government and a succession of 
decrees until the liberalisation that began in 2012.    
 
Fiji‟s new constitution is imposed from above and designed to preserve the dominant 
position of the Republic of Fiji Military Forces in the country‟s political affairs. The 
constitution makes one overdue reform long promised by Bainimarama. The new 
voting system – open list proportional representation for a parliament of 50 seats – at 
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last breaks from the communal voting systems which have institutionalised racial 
division and race-based political representation since before independence. Yet as 
Anthony Regan points out, few other features of the new constitution would be 
welcomed by those seeking a true democracy in Fiji: „The concentration of power in 
the hands of the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General is remarkable. They 
effectively control appointments of all judges and all constitutional office-holders and 
Commissions. The PM can appoint as many MPs as he/she wishes to the Cabinet. 
Decrees can continue to be made by the current government until Parliament meets 
after the election, and all Decrees are superior to the Constitution.‟5   
 
Nevertheless, Bainimarama has stood down as military commander, he will stand for 
the elections as a civilian and the elections will go ahead later this year. Fiji will 
emerge not exactly as a democratic state, but as a more democratic one that it has 
been since 2006.  
 
Pacific Development and Pacific Economic Growth 
Twenty years after Pacific 2010, most of the Pacific is in better shape than the 
pessimists predicted it would be by now but in worse shape than the optimistic ones 
predicted. Even in PNG – the region‟s least effective state – economic growth, 
though not development (these are two different things), has surpassed 
expectations. Why, in the face of such doom-saying,  have things turned out this 
way?  
 
With the wisdom of hindsight, we can now see that the Australian experts of the early 
1990s made a number of mistakes:  
(i) under-estimated the positive economic impact of remittance flows on 
Samoa, Tonga, Fiji, Kiribati, Tuvalu, Tokelau, Niue and Cook Islands. This 
is a major theme in the situation of the contemporary Pacific, as we shall 
see from the Populations on the Move session on Wednesday.  
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(ii)  They placed excessive faith in good governance to produce economic 
growth. It may be a good thing but it is only weakly related to economic 
growth.  
(iii) They could not foresee that trouble in the region – in the context of 9/11 
and the Bali bombings - would boost development assistance and elicit a 
decade-long regional intervention in Solomon Islands.  
(iv) And although the Chinese economy was growing, they did not expect 
China and East Asia more generally to become so central to the economic 
and aid prospects of the Pacific Islands.  
 
Let us consider these issues one by one, beginning with remittances and looking 
back with the benefit of 20 years‟ hindsight. Continuing emigration and a flow of 
remittances has helped to confound the Australian predictions of the 1990s that the 
region would now be over-populated and impoverished. The importance of 
remittances for Pacific countries has grown since the 1990s, and Fiji has joined 
Samoa, Tonga, Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tokelau, Tuvalu and the Federated States of 
Micronesia as an economy deriving foreign income from remittances in notable 
amounts. Remittances are worth about 5% of Fiji‟s GDP and somewhat more as a 
proportion of GDP in Tuvalu, Kiribati and the FSM. In Samoa and Tonga they are 
worth about 25% of GDP, and although Cook Islands keeps no record of them, their 
value might be even more in that country. Contrary to expectations the flow of 
remittances – while interrupted by the global financial crisis – has not diminished 
over time and in fact it was increasing to Samoa, Tonga and Fiji, the largest 
recipients, in the first half of 2013. We should keep this in mind when we think about 
what kind of Pacific policy Australia should have, and the issue of Australia‟s 
openness to some of its closest neighbours.  
 
The second issue is good governance. The relationship between good governance 
and economic growth is less straightforward than many have assumed. Good 
governance may not characterise the political systems of PNG and Solomon Islands, 
but they are both experiencing economic growth. The Asian Development Bank 
predicts 6% growth for PNG and 4% for Solomon Islands in 2014, the two highest 
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rates in the region apart from the artificial case of Nauru, where „growth is driven by 
the expansion of the Australian Regional Processing Centre‟.6  
 
Their success comes from external circumstances in the form of demand for 
minerals, energy and raw materials. And that raises the third issue, the rise of China 
and the prosperity of East Asia. These, not the state of governance, have been the 
key factors behind recent economic growth in PNG and Solomon Islands. 
Conversely, Samoa, which has done much of what was asked of it by the free 
market and governance experts, has struggled to grow fast. Good governance, it 
seems, has only a weak relationship with economic growth.7 East Asia is central to 
the prospects of the Pacific. The long term customers for PNG‟s LNG, once it starts 
flowing in 2014, are from China (Sinopec), Taiwan (CPC Corporation) and Japan 
(Osaka Gas Company Limited and TEPCO), energy suppliers in the fastest growing 
region of the global economy, East Asia. Resource security is central to China‟s 
interest in the Pacific Islands as in other parts of the developing world.  
 
East Asia has the energy and minerals markets that not only sustain a huge mining 
industry in Australia but are the force behind the growing predominance of mining in 
the Pacific Islands. The economic state of the Pacific, especially in western 
Melanesia but potentially everywhere because of what lies on the floor of the Pacific 
Ocean, is being increasingly determined by mining. Mines are hardly new in the 
Pacific, but mining is now on a vastly larger scale than a century ago. Since 
independence Papua New Guinea has become a mining economy par excellence – 
largely dependent at least for the modern sector of the economy on gold, copper, 
nickel and other minerals together with oil and gas.  
Solomon Islands has one mine – Gold Ridge, a gold mine that closed during the 
tensions more than a decade ago and reopened in 2010 – and is promised another 
one, this time reckoned to be as much as ten times the size of Gold Ridge. Fiji‟s 
mines, old and new, are coming under Chinese ownership. Vatukoula Gold Mines, 
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 ADB Pacific Economic Monitor, Dec. 2013, pp.2 and 8. 
http://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/pub/2013/pacmonitor-dec2013.pdf 
7
 Jome Kwame Sundaram and Anis Chowdhury, eds, Is Good Governance Good for Development? Bloomsbury 
Academic, London, 2012. 
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which has been operating in Fiji almost continuously since the 1930s, is majority-
owned by Zhongrun International Mining Company Limited, based in Jinan, 
Shandong Province and the bauxite mine at Nawailevu, Vanua Levu, is owned by 
the Australian-based Chinese company Xinfa Aurum Exploration, which had shipped 
350,000 tonnes of bauxite to China by early 2013.8  
The most transformative Pacific mining investment, however, may still be to come. 
The Canadian company Nautilus Minerals, which has been exploring the seabed off 
Papua New Guinea since 1997, plans to begin mining copper, gold and silver there 
in 2014. Nautilus holds tenements for possible future mining in the exclusive 
economic zones of Tonga, the Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and New Zealand, and 
was one of the companies to gain special prospecting licences for the Fiji seabed 
region in 2013.9  
Pacific Islanders have objected to seabed mining and its potentially destructive 
impact on the marine environment. A group of NGOs including „Stop Experimental 
Seabed Mining in the Pacific‟ took the PNG government to court in 2013 in an 
attempt to prevent Nautilus from proceeding.10 Pacific governments, on the other 
hand, welcome the possible wealth that might come from seabed mining. Pacific 
Island countries, some of which combine tiny land areas with the largest maritime 
exclusive zones in the world, see seabed mining as a quick development solution 
and they are being encouraged to do this by the European Union and the SPC. 
According to the Tongan delegate to the 2013 meeting of the International Seabed 
Authority in Jamaica, „our economy, our country, our people are searching for ways 
in which we may be able to improve our livelihood through better social and 
economic circumstances‟. In this pro-seabed mining spirit, Fiji has issued an 
International Seabed Minerals Management Decree aimed at regulating seabed 
mining, Cook Islands plans to open its seabed for tender this year, and Bluewater 
                                                 
8
 ‘Mining headway’, Fiji Times Online, 21 Feb. 2013.  
9
 http://www.nautilusminerals.com/s/Home.asp; ‘18 Deep-Sea Mining Prospecting Licenses Approved By Fiji. 
Exploration could lead to ways to mine safely: official’, Fiji Times 12 Dec. 2013.  
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 ‘Civil society groups take PNG government to court over Nautilus seabed mining project’. Radio Australia, 11 
Nov. 2013.  
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Metals has been granted licences to explore the seabed in Temotu Province, 
Solomon Islands, for copper and gold.11  
Fourth, let us consider the developments that boosted the flow of development 
assistance to the Pacific Islands in the last decade. Trouble in the Pacific generates 
aid to the Pacific, especially from Australia, which has a strategic interest is the 
security, stability and cohesion of its immediate neighbourhood. That neighbourhood 
in the Pacific consists of small, developing states – some so small as to be ongoing 
experiments in sovereignty – and the Australian strategic calculation since the 1970s 
has been that Australia should do all it can to enhance the development and 
economic growth of Pacific Island countries, and in this way ensure that they are 
politically stable and friendly. In this way, Australian development assistance has 
been a security instrument as well as a mechanism intended to improve 
development outcomes in a region that will always matter to Australia.  
The decision by the Howard government to establish the Regional Assistance 
Mission to Solomon Islands was driven by the perception that 9/11 and the Bali 
bombings had changed the strategic outlook for Australia by rendering small, weak 
states potential security risks. Trouble in the Solomons, which took the form of the 
„tensions‟ that afflicted that country for more than five years, suddenly assumed a 
new, strategic significance that attracted the attention of the defence and national 
security communities in Canberra and Wellington. And when the Howard 
government sent Australian troops and police to Guadalcanal to lead the regional 
mission in 2003, it saw the intervention as part of a wider Pacific recommitment that 
would also boost aid spending elsewhere in the region, especially in PNG. The result 
was that Australia doubled its development assistance to the region in 2004-05 and 
increased its aid to PNG by a third, beginning a process that continued under the 
Rudd government elected in 2007. 12 
 
That surge in Australian aid, beginning with the government of John Howard 
and sustained by those of Kevin Rudd and Julia Gillard, is now over. Trouble in the 
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Pacific has receded, so aid has receded, and the Abbott government is in a mood of 
retrenchment. The government has abolished AusAID as a separate agency, 
incorporating it into the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and made large 
cuts to the aid budget, exempting only PNG and Nauru, the two Pacific countries 
with detention centres for refugees who attempted to get to Australia by boat. Aid 
cuts applied to all other Pacific countries and to Pacific regional programs.   
 
As if to symbolise the shift of the Pacific towards Asia, China increased 
assistance to the Pacific just as Australia reduced its own. At the China-Pacific 
Island Countries Economic Development and Cooperation Forum in Guangzhou in 
2013, attended by representatives from Micronesia, Samoa, Papua New Guinea, 
Vanuatu, the Cook Islands, Tonga, Niue and Fiji, China offered them a new soft loan 
facility of $US1 billion for use on roads, bridges, ports and other infrastructure, plus 
another $US1 billion on commercial terms.    
 
The rest of the world is more interested in the Pacific than it used to be, a 
situation that is producing a new confidence in Pacific leaders. PNG is contemplating 
setting up new diplomatic missions in Tel Aviv, Shanghai and Paris to expand its 
present network, which includes not only Australia, New Zealand, Indonesia, the 
USA and a number of Pacific countries, but also Singapore, Japan, South Korea, 
China, the Philippines, Malaysia, India, the UK and Belgium.13 PNG leaders have 
even talked of their country becoming an aid donor to their Pacific neighbours and 
have promised to help pay for the expense of the 2014 Fiji elections.  
 
Fiji is also diversifying its diplomatic connections. In the last few years new Fiji 
missions have appeared in Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, South Korea, North 
Korea and the UAE, and Fiji joined the G77+China, becoming its chair for 2013. At 
the same time, Fiji has supported and created regional organisations that owe 
nothing to the Pacific Islands Forum or to Australia and New Zealand. Fiji‟s central 
aim has been to reduce the influence of Australia and New Zealand in the Pacific 
Islands while building its own. The Melanesian Spearhead Group is more active 
politically than at any time since its formation in the 1980s, and Bainimarama‟s 
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Pacific Islands Development Forum (PIDF), funded in part by UAE and Kuwait, met 
for the first time in Fiji in 2013. Not every Pacific leader attended the Fiji meeting– 
Prime Minister Peter O‟Neill of PNG was not there – but it symbolised a new spirit of 
Pacific independence. The chief guest was Xanana Gusmao, Prime Minister of 
Timor-Leste, which donated $US250, 000 towards the costs of the new PIDF 
secretariat, to be based in Suva.  
The Pacific plays more than ever before on a world stage. Not many people know, 
for example, that there are Papua New Guinean peacekeepers in Darfur and South 
Sudan, or that 600 Fijian peacekeepers are with the UN Disengagement Observer 
Force on the Golan Heights border between Israel and Syria, and that they have 
been partly equipped by Russia, or that more than 170 students from Solomon 
Islands, Kiribati, Vanuatu and Tuvalu have enrolled in medical training courses in 
Cuba since 2008.  
The Australian pessimism of the 1990s about the Pacific was excessive, as it often 
is.  Remittance flows have grown in the last 20 years and underpin the economies of 
more Pacific countries than ever before. Good governance is good for development 
but is weakly related to economic growth, as shown by two of the fastest growing 
Pacific economies, PNG and Solomon Islands. And in a way that could not be 
foreseen in 1993, East Asian demand is determining the economic state of the 
Pacific, especially in western Melanesia and potentially everywhere because of what 
lies on the floor of the Pacific Ocean. The Chinese economy has grown exponentially 
in the last 29 years, and the Chinese government is extending investment and 
influence to the developing world.  
 
What, then, about Australia‟s present policy towards the Pacific? 
In the first place, Australia‟s policy towards PNG and Nauru has been hijacked by 
our asylum seeker policy. Asylum seekers complicate the PNG-Australia security 
relationship. The Asylum Seeker Processing Centre on Manus Island was built in 
2001, closed in 2008, and then re-opened in November 2012 as the Australian 
government sought to discourage the flow of potential refugees south from 
Indonesia. Australia announced on 19 July 2013 that henceforth all asylum seekers 
reaching Australian territory would be resettled in PNG or some other participating 
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regional country. Under a bilateral Regional Resettlement Arrangement, PNG agreed 
– for an initial period of 12 months – to accept such people for processing, and if 
they proved to be refugees, to resettle them. Peter O‟Neill wavered on this promise 
in 2014, suggesting that other Pacific countries should bear some of the burden of 
resettlement, but soon changed course and agreed that PNG would settle them all.14  
 
A major riot in the Manus processing centre in February 2014 left one asylum seeker 
dead, and pointed to major failures in management. The incident was emblematic of 
security problems in many parts of Papua New Guinea: security was in the hands of 
a private security company, G4S, the PNG police lacked control over the situation, 
and the consequence was human rights abuse. As an Amnesty International Report 
of  December 2013 pointed out, the regional resettlement arrangement has led to 
abuses of human rights while doing little for PNG: „Papua New Guinea has thus far 
seen no significant transfer of expertise or other material benefit from Australian 
immigration officials, medical staff, caseworkers, security staff, or other 
professionals. Papua New Guinea authorities remain dependent on their Australian 
counterparts for virtually every aspect of the administration and day-to-day operation 
of both the detention centre and the Refugee Status Determination process.‟15   
 
True enough, PNG is extracting a hefty price for hosting the Manus centre, with a lot 
of extra Australian development assistance focused on infrastructure and policing, 
and with the PNG government more in control of how the money is spent. But the 
logic of such an arrangement is that, once the asylum seekers are resettled, 
Australian aid will decline again. And, in the meantime, Australia is undercutting its 
own advocacy of respect for human rights and high standards in policing and 
security. And the Pacific detention centres send another message to Pacific 
Islanders: you are not welcome in Australia either! 
 
In the second place, we return to Australia‟s definition of Papuans before the 
independence of PNG as Australian citizens with a difference, effectively barred from 
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living in mainland Australia. It is time we abandoned the mentality that lies behind 
barring Pacific Islanders from Australia. 
In the PACER Plus negotiations and elsewhere, Australia has talked the talk of 
regional integration while always excluding the movement of people from that 
concept. In other words, Australia has wanted the Pacific to agree to regional 
integration of trade and investment but not to regional integration of labour markets 
or the flow of people across borders. Yet the example of the Pacific countries that 
have remittance flows suggests that access to Australia‟s prosperity would contribute 
significantly to the Pacific prosperity that is in Australia‟s interest.  
In fact the Melanesian Spearhead Group‟s Skills Movement Scheme (SMS) is a 
more practical plan for labour mobility than anything Australia has so far produced. It 
is designed to allow 400 skilled Melanesians – nurses, doctors, engineers, 
accountants and other professionals – to move freely from one MSG country to 
another. According to MSG Secretary-General Peter Forau, the scheme offers 
„preferential treatment to parties in the MSG SMS to access employment 
opportunities‟ and has the additional benefit of providing a framework of accreditation 
and standards that „will prepare the MSG members to tap into the wider international 
labour market where there are more relatively lucrative opportunities.‟16 In other 
words, Forau sees skilled labour mobility between Melanesian countries as stepping 
stone for Pacific Islanders to the labour markets of Australia, New Zealand and other 
advanced economies.  
What has Australia done? We experimented with a seasonal labour pilot scheme 
and we now have a full scheme, but very few Pacific Islanders have been able to 
come and work in Australia as a result.  
 
What is needed is not only an expanded seasonal labour scheme, but, more 
importantly, a shift in our migration policy to establish Pacific access quotas 
permitting a certain number of Pacific Islanders – skilled or unskilled – to move to 
Australia. These quotas would not even have to be large in order to make a major 
difference to the prospects of the source countries.  
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Climate change in the atoll countries such as Kiribati and Tuvalu may well force 
Australia‟s hand on this issue anyway. As  Treasury secretary Martin Parkinson said 
recently in Washington, „ If climate change plays out the way scientists believe, then 
it will be inevitable that there will be climate change refugees in our region and it 
would naturally fall to Australia and New Zealand to welcome any of those because 
of our historic links with those countries.'‟17 But it would be immensely to our benefit 
to act now to enrich our own society by making it a more Pacific one, and to 
encourage a mutual cross-flow of people from all Pacific countries – Papua New 
Guinea included – to Australia and back the other way. It is time some of those 
former Australians from Papua were free to come here. Australia has routinely 
assumed that it has the answers that Pacific Islanders need. An Australia more open 
to Pacific people would remind us that the Pacific has answers that we need too.  
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